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ERRORS AND ETHICS: DILEMMAS IN DEATH
Penny J. Vhite*
"Whatever you think about the death penalt, a system that will take
life mustfirst give justice.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last five years, the death penalty has become a frequent topic
of discussion. While discussion of such an emotive topic is not unusual
for any period in history, the tenor of the recent dialogue is unusual. For
the most part, the discussion centers around the problems with capital
punishment, particularly its inaccuracy and unfairness. This Article
begins in Part II with a discussion of recent claims about the frequency
of errors in capital cases. Part III enumerates and discusses the factors
generally thought to be the cause of the errors. Part IV details new rules
recently adopted in one jurisdiction in an effort to eliminate the errors.
Part IV also suggests that these new rules, though worthwhile, are
actually a reiteration of long-standing ethical obligations of judges and
lawyers, the breach of which is responsible for many of the errors. Part
V recommends additional remedies which the bench and the bar must
take if there is a true commitment to providing a fair, just, and reliable
system for determining who the government is entitled to kill.

Penny J. White is an Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee College of Law
and a former trial, appellate, and supreme court justice for the State of Tennessee.
1. Habeas CorpusIssues: HearingsBefore the Subcomrn. on Civil and ConstitutionalRIqhis
of the House Comm. on the Judiciaq,102d Cong. 447 (1991) (statement of John Curtin. Jr.. th.n
President of the American Bar Association).
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ERRORS IN EXECUTIONS

A.

Attention to Errors

Public discourse about capital punishment is nothing new.
Throughout the history of the death penalty in America, its
appropriateness has been debated frequently. The subject of abolition,
prevalent in the late 1800s and early 1900s, gave way in the midtwentieth century to a discussion of execution methods.2 Citizens,
troubled by the prevalence of crime during the Great Depression,
expressed support for the ultimate punishment.3 As a result, the number
of executions peaked in the late 1930S. 4 Discussion shifted from the
question of the appropriateness of capital punishment to the method of
capital punishment
The number of annual executions declined fairly steadily from the
mid-1940s until the 1960s. 6 No executions occurred between the years of
1968 and 1976 while the courts dealt with the constitutionality of capital
punishment Although discussion about capital punishment lessened, it
never ended, and a renewed interest in the subject accompanied the
Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,' which held that capital
2. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 7-11 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) [hereinafter DEATH
PENALTY].
3. See id. at 9.
4. See id. at 10 fig.1-1.
5. The debate concerning which method of execution is more humane continues today. It has
simply shifted from concerns about the gas chamber to concerns about the electric chair. See
generally Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an UnconstitutionalMethod of Execution? The
Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551 (1994). Much of the debate
has centered around botched executions in Florida. In March 1997, during the execution by
electrocution of Pedro Medina, flames shot from the condemned's headpiece. See Doug Martin,
Flames Eruptfrom Killer'sHeadpiece, GAINESVILLE SUN, Mar. 26, 1997, at IA.Two experts hired
by the governor determined that the fire started because of the improper application of a sponge to
Medina's head. See id. Two years later, the execution of Allen Lee Davis prompted Justice Shaw of
the Supreme Court of Florida to write that Davis "was brutally tortured to death by the citizens of
Florida" by an "act[] more befitting a violent murderer than a civilized state." Provenzano v. Moore,
744 So. 2d 413, 440 (Fla. 1999) (Shaw, J., dissenting); see also id. at 442-44 (providing
photographs of Allen Lee Davis' execution). In October 2001, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
"future use of electrocution as a means of executing death sentences in Georgia would violate the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment" in the state constitution. Dawson v. State, No.
S01A1041, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 785, at *3 (Ga. Oct. 5, 2001).
6. See DEATH PENALTY, supranote 2, at 13.
7. See id.
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The Court issued a one paragraph per curiam opinion
"hold[ing] that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute[s] cruel
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punishment was not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment Four
years later when the Court approved new capital punishment systems in

four states,'0 the plurality opinions cited increased popular support for
capital punishment as one justification for the decision."
What is unique about the death penalty dialogue that has occurred
in the last decade is its focus. For the most part, recent discussions have

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 239-40.
Each Justice then wrote separately with Justices Douglas. Brennan. Stewart, White, and ,Marhall
concurring, see id. at 240, and Chief Justice Burger dissenting with Justices Blaekmun, Powell. and
Rehnquist. See id.
9. See e.g., id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring). The 50.000 words of the nine separate
opinions in Furman v. Georgia emphasized the unconstitutionality of a capital punishment system
which operated arbitrarily or discriminatorily. Justice Douglas. for example, concluded that the
death penalty would be unusual, and thus in violation of the Eighth Aezrndrnnt, if it wvas
administered in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. See id. at 249. 255-57 jDauglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan emphasized the need for proportionality and found no reason to
believe that the death penalty served any legitimate penal purpose more effectively than alte-nati%e
punishment. See id. at 279-80 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Stevart focs.d
on arbitrariness and decried a "system[] that permit[s] this unique penalty to be so ,.antonly and so
freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Marshall concluded that the death
penalty was per se unconstitutional because it was excessive and "morally unacceptable." See id. at
358-60 (larshall, J., concurring). He suggested that a fully informed citizenry would find the death
penalty to be unacceptable in light of its arbitrary and discriminatory use. See id. at 361-64
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justice White believed that the state laws before the Court violated the
Constitution because they were rarely used and had ceased to accomplish a meaningful sentencing
purpose. See id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
10. In order to resume executions, the states began revising their death penalty statutes to
attempt to address the problems identified in Furman. Four years after Funman, the Court oQpened
the doors to America's death chambers when it held that three southern states had been succesful in
their efforts to constitutionalize their administration of capital punishment. Sce Gregg v. Georgia.
428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 24- 260 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 277 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Florida Te'as, North
Carolina, Louisiana, and Georgia, persons had been sentenced to death under modified state
statutes. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162; Proffiit, 428 U.S. at 247; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 26S; Woc on v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
328 (1976) (plurality opinion). The five cases were consolidated for appeal. The statutes of Georgia,
Florida, and Texas, passed constitutional muster the mandatory death statutes of the Louisiana and
North Carolina legislatures did not. See Gregg. 428 U.S. at 207; Proghtt 428 U.S. at 260. Jurck, 428
U.S. at 277; IVoodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. The North Carolina statute, for
example, included a mandatory death penalty designed to treat all persons convicted of a decignated
offense alike. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286-87. According to the Court. this treatment of all of
these individuals as "a faceless, undifferentiated mass" did nothing to eliminate the concerns of
arbitrariness in sentencing. See id. at 304.
11. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, noted that "[a)
December 1972 Gallup poll indicated that 57%, of the people favored the death penalty. vhile a June
1973 Harris survey showed support of 59%." Id. at 181 n.25. The Justice also referred to state
referenda in California and Illinois that had resulted in votes supporting capital punishmnt and
efforts on behalf of thirty-five state legislatures and the United States Congress to codify at least
some capital crimes. See id. at 179-80, 181 n.25.
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focused on the reliability of the capital punishment system, rather than
whether the death penalty is right or wrong."
This is not the first time that the subject of the reliability of our
capital punishment scheme has been debated. In 1964, an essay was
published identifying seventy-four capital cases occurring between the
years of 1893 and 1962 that were said to be "errors of justice."' 3 A more
thorough study describing 350 cases of wrongful convictions between
the years of 1900 and 1985 was published in 1987.14
During this same time period, critics voiced concerns about
disparity in the use of the death penalty. Three professors conducted a
study of capital punishment in Georgia during the 1970s and concluded
that the death penalty was disparately imposed based on the race of the
victim, and to a lesser extent, the race of the accused.'" When the study
was offered as evidence of the unconstitutional application of the death
penalty in Georgia, it was rejected because, among other reasons,
"[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system" and because "'there can be no perfect procedure
for deciding in which
cases governmental authority should be used to
6
impose death."",1
B. Reactions to Error
Despite the Supreme Court's acceptance of a less than perfect
system, death penalty opponents would argue that the imperfection was
becoming more demonstrable and more disturbing. In 1992, a book
described as "the ordeal of 400 Americans wrongly convicted of crimes

12. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially
CapitalCases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 26 (1987).
13. See Hugo A. Bedau, Murder,Errors of Justice, and Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH
PENALTY INAMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 434,436 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1964).
14. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 12, at 38 tbl. 4. At the request of Attorney General
Edwin Meese, two authors researched the article and responded to it in the subsequent edition of the
Stanford Law Review. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A
Response to the Bedau-RadeletStudy, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1988); see also Hugo Adam Bedau &
Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Marknan and Cassell,41 STAN. L. REV.
161 (1988).
15. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987); RANDALL COYNE & LYN
ENTzEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 135 (1994); see also David Bruck,
Decisionsof Death,NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18, 21.
16. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312-13 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The author of McCleskey, Justice Powell, characterized his
decision in that case as one of his greatest regrets. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR. 451 (1994).
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punishable by death"' 7 was published. Its publication, according to its
authors, would form "a base line for future research into the general
problem of wrongful convictions in capital or potentially capital cases in
this century in the United States."' 9 Two Supreme Court Justices, who
had supported capital punishment during their tenures, expressed

dissatisfaction with their earlier positions.-" The American Bar
Association ("ABA"), the nation's largest organization of lawyers,
concerned about the effects of recent legal developments on the fairness
of the capital punishment system,-' began a study about the current

implementation of the death penalty. In February 1997, characterizing
the death penalty as "far from being fair and consistent, [and] instead a
haphazard maze of unfair practices with no internal consistency,"- the
17. Regis Ryan, Editorial, We Should Have the Grace to Rise Abore the DeathPenaln. PrU.
PosT-GAzErE Aug. 27, 1994, at B2.
18. See MicHAFL L. RADEL r Er AL, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVIcTio;S 1;
CAPrrAL CASES (1992).
19. Id. at x.
20. In his dissent from a denial of certiorari in McFarland%.Scott. 512 U.S. 1256 019941.
Justice Blackmun commented:
When we execute a capital defendant in this country, we rely on the belief that the
individual was guilty, and was convicted and sentenced after a fair trial, to justify the
imposition of state-sponsored killing .... My 24 years of overseeing the imposition of
the death penalty from this Court have left me in grave doubt %Nhetherthis reliance is
justified and whether the constitutional requirement of competent legal counsel for
capital defendants is being fulfilled.
Id. at 1264 (31ackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Blackmun bad concluded
that the death penalty could no longer be fairly imposed in Collins r. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141. 1145
(1994) (Blacknun, J.. dissenting from denial of certiorari). when he stated "[from this day forvard.
I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death." Justice Powell also expressed concerns about
whether the death penalty could be administered in a fair manner. See supra note 16.
21. The American Bar Association ("ABA") expressed three concerns: undermining of
important ABA recommended procedural safeguards by the states- passage of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and the defunding of postconviction defender
organizations. See A.B.A., REPORT SUBMITED WITH RECOMENDATION No. 107, at 4 WFeb. 3.
1997) [hereinafter REPORT], availableat http'.llwww.abanet.orgirrlrel07.html (last visited Mar.
13, 2001). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective DMath Penalty Act of 1996. codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2261-2266 (Supp. H 1997), among other things, imposes a statute of limitations for the filing of
habeas corpus petitions, limits the circumstances under which a federal court can grant an
evidentiary hearing in habeas corpus cases, prohibits second or successivE petitions for habeas
corpus relief except in very rare circumstances, and disallows relief unless the state court decision
was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal las.'
Id. § 2254(b)-(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); REPORT, supra, at 4: see also Williams v. Taylor. 529
U.S. 362, 379 (2000). The postconviction defender organizations had provided or recruited
representation for indigent defendants in most capital postconviction cases. See R"OT. supra, at 4.
22. REPORT, supranote 21, at 3. The full text of the ABA recommendation is as follos:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association calls upon each jurisdiction that
imposes capital punishment not to carry out the death penalty until the jurisdiction
implements policies and procedures that are consistent with the following longstanding
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ABA asked states with capital punishment statutes to cease executions

"unless and until greater fairness and due process prevail in death

penalty implementation."'
While these developments sparked debate in legal circles, it was
attention to a more stark development that caught the attention of the

public. The imperfections of America's capital punishment system
became real when Americans learned that innocent people were being

sentenced to death and executed for crimes they did not commit.24 An
investigative report by a respected newspaper detailed the cases of

thirteen wrongfully convicted individuals by a capital punishment
system where "errors and incompetence" rule and justice is often
absent.2 A book, Actual Innocence,26 detailed the circumstances of

numerous exonerations due to DNA testing.27 Many long-time supporters
American Bar Association policies intended to (1) ensure that death penalty cases are
administered fairly and impartially, in accordance with due process, and (2) minimize
the risk that innocent persons may be executed:
(i)Implementing ABA "Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases" (adopted Feb. 1989) and Association policies
intended to encourage competency of counsel in capital cases (adopted Feb. 1979,
Feb. 1988, Feb. 1990, Aug. 1996);
(ii) Preserving, enhancing, and streamlining state and federal courts' authority and
responsibility to exercise independent judgment on the merits of constitutional
claims in state postconviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings (adopted
Aug. 1982, Feb. 1990);
(iii) Striving to eliminate discrimination in capital sentencing on the basis of the
race of either the victim or the defendant (adopted Aug, 1988, Aug, 1991); and
(iv) Preventing execution of mentally retarded persons (adopted Feb. 1989) and
persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of their offenses (adopted Aug.
1983).
FURTHER RESOLVED, That in adopting this recommendation, apart from existing
Association policies relating to offenders who are mentally retarded or under the age of
18 at the time of the commission of the offenses, the Association takes no position on the
death penalty.
Id. at I.
23. Id. at 23.
24. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 17.
25. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois, C111.

Nov. 14-18, 1999, pts. 1-5, at 1. The five-part series by Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills of
the Chicago Tribune, published in November 1999, described the capital punishment system in
Illinois in this manner and also as "a system so riddled with faulty evidence, unscrupulous trial
tactics and legal incompetence that justice has been forsaken." Id., pt. 1,at 1.
26. JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FiVE DAYS TO
TRiB.,

ExEcUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED

(2000).

27. For example, Marion Coakley, who had been convicted of rape, was exonerated after
more than a dozen randomly gathered semen samples proved that he could not have been the rapist.
See id. at 30-34. Walter Tyrone Snyder, who was also wrongfully convicted of rape, spent seven
years in prison until a newly developed test for analyzing trace amounts of DNA was developed,
and proved his innocence. See id. at 67-72. Another man, Robert Miller, had been sentenced to two
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of capital punishment began to question the ability of the government to
choose the right people to execute.s

Among those who came to fear the ramifications of government
imperfection was Governor George Ryan of Illinois. Governor Ryan, a
Republican supporter of the death penalty, became alarmed after an
investigation by the Chicago Tribune exposed catastrophic problems

with the capital punishment system in Illinois.." On more than one
occasion, individuals had come within days, and sometimes hours, of

execution only to be completely exonerated by DNA or other evidence
uncovered by students investigating the case.' Governor Ryan declared
a moratorium on executions in Illinois on February 1, 2000, in light of
evidence that appellate courts had found errors in half of the capital
cases that had completed at least the first level of appeal"a and because

the number of exonerated individuals who had been previously
condemned to die exceeded the number of inmates executed since the
state's reinstatement of the death penalty."3

Governor Ryan's action was neither the first nor the last indication
that the country needed to take a long look at its capital punishment
system. The Nebraska legislature authorized, over gubernatorial veto, a
study on the fairness of the death penalty in their state.? Seven other

states commissioned studies and seven undertook measures to impose a
moratorium or abolish capital punishment." Senator Leahy, and
Representatives Delahunt and LaHood proposed an Innocence
Protection Act in Congress36 Both print and electronic media began
life sentences plus 725 years for the rape and murder of two elderly women. See id. at 85. More than
ten years after his conviction, and more than six years after exculpatory DNA evidence had been
discovered, Robert Miller was released from prison. See id. at 103-06.
28. See George F. Will, Innocent on Death Row. WASH. POST, Apr. 6.2000. at A23 ("Capital
punishment, like the rest of the criminal justice system, is a government program, so skepticism is in
order."). Reverend Pat Robertson also expressed concern about capital punishment. See Brooke A.
Masters, PatRobertson Urges Moratorimnon U.S. Executions, WASH. POST, Apr. 8. 2000, at Al
(quoting Robertson as saying "'a moratorium would indeed be very appropriate'").
29. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan: 'Until I Can Be Sure': Illinois Is FirstState to
Suspend Death Penalty, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 1. 2000, at 1.
30. See id.
31. See e.g., Armstrong & Mills, supra note 25. pt. 1, at 1.
32. See Ken Armstrong & Christi Parsons, Half of State's Death-PenaltyCases Rerersed: A
Varie y of ErrorsFoundin 130 Trials, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 22,2000, at 1.
33. At the time of Governor Ryan's announcement, thirteen Illinois death-row innutes hzd
been exonerated since 1977; twelve had been executed. See Armstrong & Mills, supranote 29, at 1.
34. Neb. L.B. 76A, 96th Leg., Ist Sess. (1999).
35. See Brooke A. Masters, A Rush on Va.'s Death Row Pace of Erecutions-Second to
Taxas's-RaisesWarningsFlags,WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2000, at Al.
36. See Innocence Protection Act of 2000, S. 2690, 106th Cong. (2000); Innocence Protection
Act of 2000, H.R. 4167, 106th Cong. (2000); see also Innocence Protection Act of 2001. SA?6,
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devoting resources to the issues surrounding the fallibility of the capital

punishment system.37
Despite the prominence of state court issues in the present capital

punishment inquiry, the concerns were not limited to state cases. In
September 2000, the United States Department of Justice
("Department") released a statistical survey regarding the federal death
penalty system.3" The survey showed that seventy-three percent of the
cases approved39 for federal death penalty prosecution between 1995 and

2000 involved minority defendants.' The intent to seek the death penalty
was withdrawn almost twice as often in cases involving white

defendants than in those involving minority defendants.' Minorities
constituted seventy-nine percent of federal death row inmates.4 ' These

and other study results prompted the Department to announce its
intention to retain outside experts to explore the situation further. Shortly
after this announcement, Senator Feingold proposed a federal
moratorium on the death penalty.43
107th Cong. (2001), reprinted in 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113 (2001). A non-binding resolution
proposed by Senator Leahy was passed by the Senate in October 2000, See Paul Coverdell National
Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000, S. 3045, 106th Cong. (2000). The resolution calls for
states to improve the quality of indigent representation in capital cases and to provide greater access
to DNA testing after conviction. See id. § 4.
37. See, e.g., Masters, supra note 35, at Al; Editorial, No System, No Justice: Prosecutors'
Zeal, Misconduct Mar Death Penalty, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 12, 2000, pts. 1-5, at 10A,
Scott Wilson, Curry, Duncan Want Md. Executions Halted, WASH. POST, June 23, 2000, at B I;
CNN TalkBack Live: Should Gary Graham Be Executed? (CNN television broadcast, June 22,
2000), available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0006/22/tl.00.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2001) (providing a transcript of the broadcast); Nightline: Crime and Punishment:A Matter of Life
and Death, pts. 1-4 (ABC News television broadcast, Sept. 12-15, 2000), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/onalr/nightline/transcripts/nlOOO912_trans.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2001)
(providing a transcript of the broadcast); The Oprah Show: Death Penalty Controversy (ABC
television
broadcast,
Sept.
28,
2000),
available
at
http:loprah.oxygen.comltows/pastshows/tows_2000/towspast.20000928.html (last visited Mar.
13, 2001).
38. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL
SURVEY (1988-2000) (Sept. 12, 2000).
39. The Department of Justice adopted a protocol in 1995 which required authorization from
the Attorney General to seek the death penalty. See id. at 2. All eligible capital cases were required
to be submitted for review. See id. Forty-two percent of the cases submitted for review came from
five of the ninety-four federal districts. See id. at T-14 tbl.5A (Maryland; New York, Eastern; New
York, Southern; Puerto Rico; Virginia, Eastern). Of the 682 cases submitted for review, the death
penalty was authorized in 159 cases. See id. at 2.
40. See id. at 11-12.
41. See id. at T-4, tbl.2A.
42. See id. at 24.
43. In September 2000, Senator Feingold introduced legislation to impose a moratorium
pending the outcome of a study commissioned on the death penalty. See Federal Death Penalty
Moratorium Act of 2000, S. 3048, 106th Cong. (2000). The legislation recommends similar action
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In the midst of this activity, the Liebman study, a twenty-three year
study on error rates in capital cases was released." Described as "the
first statistical [death penalty] study,' '5 the findings of the study were
staggering. Of the twenty-eight states whose death penalty cases were
included in the study, 46 only two states did not err at least fifty percent of
the time during the three stages of judicial review in a capital case.""
Nationally, "courts found serious, reversible error in nearly 7 of every
10" capital cases that were fully reviewed during the twenty-three year
study period!' Put in context, then, for the twenty-three year period
studied, serious error undermining the reliability of a finding of guilt, or
sentence of death, occurred in more than two out of every three death
penalty cases. 9 While that significant of an error rate is indeed
disturbing, even more troubling is the study's finding that eighty-two
percent of the capital cases that were retried resulted in either a sentence
of less than death or no sentence at all. s'
Yet, the public seems to remain supportive of capital punishment.""
If the United States is to continue its state and federal capital punishment
systems, it must devise a more reliable and accurate means of

on the part of the states and gives Congress the ultimate authority to lift the moratorium. See id.
§§ 102, 202. Similar legislation was introduced prior to September 2000, but was not acted upon.
See National Death Penalty Moratorium Act of 2000, S. 2463. 106th Cong. (2000) (also proposed
by Senator Feingold); Federal Death Penalty Abolition Act of 1999. S. 1917, 106th Cong. 1939)
(also proposed by Senator Feingold); see also Jill Zuckman, FeingoldLaunclesBill to Halt Federal
Death Penaty, CHi. TREB., Feb. 1, 2001, at 3.
44. See JAMEs S. Lt.MEAN Er AL, A BROKEN SYST'M: ERROR RTis IN CAFiiAL CASEs.
1973-1995 (2000). The authors studied cases in which death sentences were imposed during the
study period, some 5760 cases. See id. at 1.
45. Id.at i.
46. See id. at 28, 68 thl.10. Although thirty-four states have capital punishment statutes, the
study excluded those states in which capital cases had not yet been through federal habeas review.
See id. at 28.
47. See id. at 68 thl.10. The study refers to this factor as the overall success rate, meaning the
proportion of capital cases that underwent successfully the three-stage judicial re%iew inolved in
capital cases. See id. at 4.
48. Id. at i. This factor, the overall error rate, defined as the proportion of fully revieved
capital cases that were overturned at one of the three stages of judicial review, was sixty-eight
percent nationally for the 1973-1995 period. See id. at 6. "Serious [reversible] error" was defined by
the reporters as "error that substantially undermines the reliability of the guilt finding or deth
sentence imposed at trial." Id. at 5.
49. See id. at 30.
50. See id. at ii. Seven percent of those retried were found innocent of the offense. See id.
51. Polls vary, but many indicate a consistent support for capital punishment, although at a
reduced rate than other times in this century. See Death Penalty Information Center, Srmvaries of
Recent Poll Findings, at http.//%www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglPolls.hnl (last visited Mar. 13, 2001);
see also LIEBMAN Er AT-,supra note 44, at I (explaining how the two-thirds of public support for
the death penalty is a decline from the four-fifths of public support it had in 1994).
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administration. To devise a reliable system, the government should
explore what causes the multitude of errors that occur in capital cases.
Why are innocent people sent to death row? Why do mistakes that
undermine the reliability of the findings occur in more than two-thirds of
capital cases? Why is the penalty disproportionately applied to nonwhite defendants?
III. CAUSE

OF ERRORS

The Liebman study made an early diagnosis of the error-ridden
capital punishment system. 2 Its conclusions mirror those revealed by
journalists and academics who have searched for explanations. The
Liebman study found that serious error, defined as error that
"substantially undermin[es] the reliability of' the guilt finding or death
sentence imposed at trial 3 was largely attributable to four factors, two

of which account for the majority of errors. 4 Incompetent defense
lawyering and prosecutorial misconduct account for more than half of
the errors in capital cases." The remaining errors are the result of

judicial bias, legal error, or bias among jurors. 6
These indictments of the nation's capital punishment system are
neither surprising nor new. Volumes have been written about the
conduct of counsel in capital cases 7 and the results of biased judges and
misinformed juries."
52. These findings were based upon the errors that led to reversal of capital judgments at the

state postconviction level. See LIEBMAN Er AL., supra note 44, at 3.
53. Id. at 5.

54. See id. at ii.
55. See id. The Liebman study attributes thirty-seven percent of the error to ineffective
assistance of counsel and sixteen to nineteen percent to prosecutorial suppression of Brady
evidence. See id. app. at C-2 to C-4.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorderin the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution,
85 MIcH. L. REV. 1741, 1811 (1987); Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 347-50 (1983); Retta A. Miller &
Kimberly O'D. Thompson, "Death Penalty" Sanctions: When to Get Them and Hov to Keep Then,
46 BAYLOR L. REV. 737, 746-47 (1994); Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution:
Fairnessvs. "Process," 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 327-28 (1999); David L. Szlanfucht, Are Capital
Defense Lawyers Educable?A Moderately Hopeful Reportfrom the Trenches, 19 MISS. C. L. REV.
305, 305 (1999); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at CapitalSentencing, 39
STAN. L. REv. 461,468 (1987); Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
in CapitalTrials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1923 (1994).
58. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759,
760 (1995); Sherrilyn A. Ifill,
Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and
Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 98 (1997); Amy D. Ronner, When Judges
Impose the Death Penalty After the Jury Recommends Life: Harris v. Alabama as the Excision of the
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A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
It is imperative that the courts have before them counsel who are
competent in capital cases ... and it is very difficult to obtain
them.... ['Jhe records are huge. The expenditure of time is great. The

lawyers who take these cases are burnt out after taking just one,
whether they win it or lose it. And this is a very, very difficult ...
59
area.

That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside
the accused... is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command [of
the right to counsel].... An accused is entitled to be assisted by an
attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary
to ensure that the trial is fair.60
Despite the above language, the standard for evaluating the
effectiveness of counsel in criminal cases, even capital ones, is
extremely low. The standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington'
requires an evaluation, first, of counsel performance, and second, of the
effect of that performance on the outcome of the case. ' Counsel's
performance must be "deficient."" But even if counsel performs
deficiently, the errors do not warrant the reversal of a conviction unless
the error resulted in prejudice to the accused. As a result, even when
counsel's conduct is deplorable, the judge may deny relief based on the
finding that the jury would have sentenced the defendant to death
anyway. Very often, defendants who had wholly ineffective trial lawyers

Tympanic Membrane in an Augmentedly Death-BiasedProcedure,23 HASTEGS CoNsr. LQ. 217,
221 (1995).
59. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judieiar; and Related Agencies
Appropriationsfor 1996: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
104th Cong. 15 (1995) (statement of Justice Anthony Kennedy. U.S. Supreme Court).
60. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,685 (1984).
61. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). On October 9, 2001, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case
that raised as one issue standards for capital case counsel. See AbdurRahman v. Bell. No. 00-174-2
2001 U.S. LEXIS 9754, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 9,2001).
62. See id. at 687.

63. A "deficient" counsel is one whose errors undermine the accused's right to a fair trial. See
id. at 685, 687. A fair trial, however, is viewed by the Supreme Court as one that produces a
"reliable" result. See id. at 687. In reviewing counsel's performance. "a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." Id. at 689.
64. The test for prejudice is whether the defendant can "show that there is a reasonabIe
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. at 694.
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receive no relief on appeal or postconviction because of the restrictive
Stricklandstandard. 6'
Because of the high standard that must be met before a capital case

is reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel, only the most egregious
errors are corrected. 6 Counsel is presumed to have performed within the
range of acceptable professional conduct.' Given that presumption, and
the difficulty of proving prejudice after the fact, death-sentenced

individuals who have received atrocious representation are rarely
entitled to relief. The narrow opening for a finding of ineffective
assistance under Strickland makes the number of cases in which
ineffective assistance is found very small indeed.
Most of those who have attempted to dissect the cases involving

ineffective assistance of counsel attribute the problem to insufficient
training and experience, as well as insufficient resources. 6 Lawyers, less

than a year out of law school, who have never tried a criminal case have
been appointed to represent individuals charged with capital offenses.69
Others have been appointed, not based on their qualifications, but on
their quickness. 70 For a multitude of reasons, none of which are valid,
people facing the death penalty are appointed lawyers who sleep7 I and

drink during trial, or who practically stipulate the client's guilt or the
appropriateness of a death sentence. 72 Counsel in one capital case in

Alabama was so drunk during the trial that he was held in contempt, sent
65. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 91, 134, 147 & n315 (1995).
66. See id. at 160.
67. See id. at 120.
68. See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 337-38 (1995).
69. See Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated by 507 U.S. 1026
(1993).
70. Judges in Texas and California have appointed counsel in capital cases who are known for
their speed in concluding the cases. See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing
and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 783, 789; Ted Rohrlich, The Case of the Speedy Attorney, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at
Al.
71. Joe Frank Cannon, the sleeping, "'greased-lightning' lawyer in Texas, represented
Calvin Burdine, but slept through much of the trial. See Paul M. Barrett, On the Defense: Lawyer's
Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al. He also
used the words "'queer"' and "'fairy"' in court documents in his representation of Burdine, who
was openly gay. See Mark Ballard, Judge Won't Stay Execution Despite Sleeping Defense,
RECORDER, Apr. 10, 1995, at 1.
72. An Alabama lawyer failed to appear for oral argument before the Alabama Supreme Court
after filing his one-page brief citing one case. See Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1131 (11 th Cir.
1991); see also Panel Discussion: The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency and Due Process in
Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1105, 1127 (1994).
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to jail, and entered the courtroom from lockup with his client the next
morning for trial.' Attorneys who are awake and sober may have not
read a single case on capital punishment and may have never tried a
murder case.74 Still others have spent less than a week preparing for a
7
case which should require 400 to 1000 hours of preparation.
In striking examples of counsel incompetence, a defendant
sentenced to death saw his lawyer only two times before his trial for a
total of seventy-five minutes. 6 The lawyer did not interview any of the
twenty witnesses who claimed to have witnessed the killing." Counsel in
Louisiana completed the penalty phase of a capital case in twenty
minutes by stipulating to the client's age.
One lawyer, who failed to retrieve his client's medical or military
records and asked no questions about the client's mental background
during the seven hours he spent investigating the case, did not learn that
his client had been on psychotropic medication, had been diagnosed as
psychotic by three psychiatrists, and had undergone eighty-one shock
therapy treatments. 9 In another case, court-appointed counsel was
unaware that the sentencing phase would immediately follow the
determination of guilt on a capital offense.!" As a result he was
completely unprepared for the sentencing."' The lawyer waived the
opening statement, presented no character witnesses, and failed to
introduce any evidence of his client's mental condition, which included
"fixated" infantile functioning at an infantile level with an IQ between
f'fty-eight and sixty-seven, brain damage due to blows to the head, and
shock therapy treatment.n
It is not only the lack of skill that contributes to poor performance
in capital cases, it is also the lack of compensation. In one case, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously reversed a death
sentence based on the incompetence of counsel who was paid $11.84 per
73. See Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368,377 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).

74. See Commonwealth v. Stoyko, 475 A.2d 714, 721-24 (Pa. 1984) (noting that nrither of
the appointed counsel raised any issues during the penalty phase).
75. See Stephanie Saul, When Death Is the Penaly: Attorneys for Poor Defendants Often
Lack Experience and Skill, NEVSDAY (New York City), Nov. 25, 1991, at 8.
76. See Stephen N. Maskaleris, Two Views of America's Obsession with Death: Cra'aler
Defense Leads to the Death Penalty.forMany, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 12, 1996, at A21.
77. See State v. Messiah, 538 So. 2d 175, 186 (La. 1988); Stuart Taylor, Jr., He Didn'tDo It,

Am. LAW., Dec. 1994, at 70,70.
78. See Messiah, 538 So. 2d at 187.
79. See Agan v. Singletary, 12 F.3d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1994).
80. See Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 852 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991).
81. Seeid.at852n.1,853.

82. See id. at 852, 857-58.
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hour. "Unfortunately," the court commented, "the justice system got
[just] what it paid for." 4 In another example of cheap justice, a
California lawyer told the jury in his ten minute closing argument that
his client could not "'live with that beast from' within any longer' and
that a death sentence might be 'the gift of life."'
Courts that barely pay lawyers do no better at funding essential
defense services. Despite the constitutional right of an indigent capital
defendant to expert services necessary for an effective defense,"6 the
right is often a hollow one. Many jurisdictions experience funding
crises." Counsel attempting to receive funds to hire experts may find
available funds to be extremely limited or nonexistent. As a result,
counsel may be unable to investigate defenses and to collect evidence on
the client's behalf." For example, counsel, in Texas, was warned not to
request expert or investigative funds since the court-appointed fees for
co-counsel had already depleted the county's budget."
Just before he retired from the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun
spoke of the dilemma of underpaid appointed counsel who finds his
client's Ake v. Oklahoma ° rights to exist in name only:
Court-awarded funds for the appointment of investigators and experts
often are either unavailable, severely limited, or not provided by state
courts. As a result, attorneys appointed to represent capital defendants
at the trial level frequently are unable to recoup even their overhead
costs and out-of-pocket expenses, and effectively may be required to
work at minimum wage or below while funding from their own
pockets their client's defense. 9'

83. See Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
84. Id. Martinez-Macias' counsel did not call available witnesses or investigate mitigating
evidence and prepared for the sentencing phase only by speaking with Martinez-Macias and his
wife at a luncheon break during the sentencing proceedings. See Adam Cohen, The Difference a
Million Makes, TIME, June 19, 1995, at 43.
85. Bob Egelko, 9th Circuit Overturns Death Sentence, L.A. DAILY J., May 17, 1994, at 2
(quoting the California lawyer).
86. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
87. See Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So. 2d 326,327-28 (Fla. 1999).
88. In seventeen capital cases in Tennessee prior to May 15, 1989, no mitigation proof was
offered during the sentencing phase. See State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tenn. 1989).
89. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Federalism and the Criminal Justice System: The Defunding
of the Post Conviction Defense Organizationsas a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L.

REv.863, 893 (1996).
90. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
91. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1258 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (citations omitted).
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Realizing that they may not be paid,' experts decline to work in certain
jurisdictions. 9
If inadequate funding of the capital defense system contributes to
errors in the results, then the behavior of some court-appointed counsel

only exacerbates the problem. Co-counsel has at times presented
conflicting defenses during the same trial." Other counsel have berated
their clients or referred to them by using ethnic or racial slurs. ' Far too

many more have provided outrageously insufficient representation."
Despite the deplorable state of indigent capital representation, and

the delays, costs, and hardships that it causes, prosecutors have almost
routinely objected to efforts to improve the quality of indigent

representation. In 1990, the National Association of District Attorneys
adopted a resolution opposing legislation in Congress which would have
established standards of competency for capital defenders. ' Similarly, in
1993, several prosecutors opposed a more modest effort to set minimum
standards for capital defenders. 3 This resistance to efforts to improve the

fairness of the capital punishment system suggests that "[tlhe enthusiasm
of prosecutors to continue to take every advantage [in capital litigation]
has not been tempered by the poverty and powerlessness of those
accused of capital crimes."'

92. See Fredric N. Tulsky, What PriceJustice? PoorDefendantsPay the Cost as Courts Sate
on Murder Trials, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 1992, at Al (quoting a University of Penns)hania
professor who declines work in Philadelphia saying, "'I like to choose my charities"I.
93. In a capital case in Philadelphia, a city saddled with financial constraints, ajudge denied
counsel's request for funds for expert services as unwarranted until the issue of capital sentencing
arose. See MICHAEL KROLL, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.. JUSTICE ON THE CHEAF: THE
PHILADELpIA STORY 6 (May 1992), available at http'J/www.deathpenaltinfo.or-dpic.rg9.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2001). When the client was convicted of a capital offense and the mation vas
renewed, the judge denied the motion relying on the client's statement that he had "'no problems.'"
See id. When defense counsel announced that he had retained a psychologist, the judge istnrzcted
the la.wyer that he would have to pay the expert out of his court-appointed attorney fee. See id.
94. See Ross v. Kemp, 393 S.E.2d 244,245 (Ga. 1990).
95. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (llth Cir. 1982); EX pirte
Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724,736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
96. See Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime butfor the Worst Lanyer, 103 YALE L. 1835, 1845 n.56 (1994) (collecting caszs).
97. See id. at 1875.
98. See id. at 1875-76.
99. Id. at 1877.
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B. ProsecutorialMisconduct
The [prosecutor] is the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose
interest... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. '
The second most frequent explanation for errors in capital cases is
the misconduct of prosecutors. Despite the prosecutor's obligation to
"do justice," charges of misconduct against prosecutors in capital cases
include allegations that prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence,
knowingly used false evidence, exercised their discretion disparately,
and made inappropriate arguments.''
Appellate judges have used varying terms to describe the antics of
prosecutors in capital cases. A Pennsylvania prosecutor whose tactics
were described as "outlandish" and "out of control" was deemed
unworthy of belief by a federal district magistrate." Illinois appellate
courts have frequently admonished prosecutors for their overzealous and
inappropriate conduct. 3 The conduct of some Cook County prosecutors,
for example, has been described by an Illinois Appellate Court as
"'[i]nexcusable,"' and "'[a]n insult to the court and to the dignity of the
trial bar.." 4
In other states, prosecutors who have withheld evidence in capital
cases have advanced to positions of greater prominence in the legal
profession. For example, a Georgia prosecutor became a Congressman
after he successfully prosecuted seven men who were later exonerated
for murder, one of whom was sentenced to death.'9 In New Mexico, a
former prosecutor cited for failure to disclose evidence in a capital case
had been named chief counsel for the state's lawyer disciplinary board
by the time the illegal conviction was overturned.'6
Some former prosecutors attribute the overzealousness of the
prosecution's death squads to an "'adrenalin rush"' that pushes
100. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
101. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 208487, 2110-11, 2094 n.160 (2000).
102. See Report and Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Richard A. Powers 111,Diggs v.
Vaughn, No. 90-2083 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 1991).
103. See, e.g., People v. Weathers, 338 N.E.2d 880, 881, 883-84 (Ill. 1975).
104. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How ProsecutorsSacrifice Justice to
Win: Break Rules, Be Promoted,CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, pt. 5, at 1 (quoting an Illinois Appellate
Court). The prosecuting attorneys described in these ways by the appellate court in Illinois all
received promotions within their offices and now serve as judges. See id.
105. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error:How ProsecutorsSacrifice Justice
to Win: The Verdict: Dishonor,CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, pt. 1, at 1.
106. See id.
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prosecuting attorneys over the line.' 7 Other individuals attribute the

barrage of misconduct to society's willingness to ignore rule breaking
when "'it serves the ultimate end[- of justice.""'t " Whatever the reason,
prosecutorial misconduct, according to one expert, has grown to

epidemic proportions and is largely
controlled only by the individual
09
prosecutor's "'inner morality."1

The frequency of prosecutorial misconduct is difficult to ascertain.
Often, the misconduct goes undiscovered. In one case in Florida,
evidence which freed a man who had served twenty-one years in prison
was only discovered when it was stolen from the prosecutor's office."0t
In other cases, prosecutorial misconduct has been uncovered only after
journalists or citizens have filed Freedom of Information Act requests or
after the true perpetrator of the crime has confessed."'

One aspect of prosecutorial misconduct is more visible, but is no
less tolerated. Often, in capital cases, prosecutors pepper their closing
arguments with comments intended to induce fear, hate, or
intimidation.' A favorite tactic seems to be to equate the defendant with

some notoriously feared individual such as Charles Manson."' Whether
untempered prosecutor's arguments in capital murder cases are caused
by an adrenalin rush or fear of losing the case, the boldness of some of

the arguments is shocking.
107. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error:How ProsecutorsSacrificeJustice to
Win: 77w Flip Side of a FairTrial, CHI. TRm., Jan. 11, 1999, pt. 2. at I (quoting Mickel Ficaro.
former supervisor in the Illinois State Attorney's Office).
108. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error: How ProsecutorsSacrifice Justice to
Win: Prosecutionon Trial in DuPage, CHIi. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999. pt. 3.at 1.Possley and Armstrong
also quote Professor Lavrence Marshall as saying: "Many players in the system-judges, dzfen e
lawyers, prosecutors-kmow some of the stuff that happens, but nonetheless tend to turn a blind eye.
There's a feeling that that is how it works, that it's legitimate to bend the truth
sometime-s ,hen you
are doing it vth--quote, the greater good, end quote-in mind." Id.
109. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 105. pt. 1. at I (quoting Professor Bennett
Gershman). Bennett Gershman, a law professor at Pace University who has written extensively on
the subject of prosecutorial misconduct, refers to the phenomenon as a "'serious cancer in our
system of justice.' 'There is no check on prosecutorial misconduct except for the prosecutor's ovm
attitudes and beliefs and inner morality."' Id. (quoting Professor Bennett Gershman. A frequent
nemesis of prosecutors, Professor Alan Dershowitz has commented that "'[w]inning has becon
more important than doing justice."' Il (quoting Professor Alan Dershowitz).
110. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Tainted Verdicts Resurrect Specter of Erecuting the lnngcent,
N.Y. TwMEs, May 3, 1989, at AI8.
111. See Liebman, supranote 101, at 2048 n.84, 20S9 n.15 1.
112. For a collection of all cases in Nevada, for example, where prosecutors closing arguments
have been cited by the court as in error, but nonetheless harmless, see The National Judicial
College,
Nevada
Capital
Cases
Resource
Center,
at
http-./Iwv.judges.org/nv_easeimages/easesindex2.html (last
visited Mar. 13,2001).
113. See Howard v. State, 800 P.2d 175, 177 (Nev. 1990).

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

(Vol. 29:1265

For example, prosecutors sometimes place inordinate and unfair

responsibilities on the capital jury. Prosecutors offered one such
argument in a capital case in Illinois when they told the jurors that "'you
will live with your decision today and so will the rest of us in our

society. And so will the rest of the people from that neighborhood-if
you let him escape responsibility for his crime.""' 1 4 A Nevada prosecutor
similarly told the jury that no matter what they did, their verdict would
sentence someone to death."5 The only question was whether the death
16

sentence would be for the defendant or for another innocent victim.

1

Prosecutors have rabidly characterized the accused as "'mad dog[s],'
"disease," "plague," and "pestilence."'' 7

Prosecutors have also been faulted for allowing racial bias to enter
into their arguments," 8 their decision making in capital cases" 9 and their
selection of petit juries. One prosecutor was found to have used over
ninety percent of his peremptory challenges in capital cases to excuse

black jurors.' ° To assist in his efforts of eliminating certain individuals
from the jury pool, the prosecutor had taught the court clerk how to
secretly underrepresent blacks and women in the jury pools.' Another
prosecutor who tried a capital defendant three times, each time used
every peremptory challenge to exclude blacks from the jury, seating all

white juries twice in a city in which blacks constituted one-third of the
total population.'2 More subtle prosecutors may ask questions of white
jurors in a different manner than they do of black jurors.'13 They may
challenge black jurors who have certain characteristics or give certain
114. Possley & Armstrong, supra note 107, pt. 2, at 1 (quoting the prosecutor) (discussing
People v. Stack, 470 N.E.2d 1252 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984)).
115. See McKenna v. State, 968 P.2d 739,747 (Nev. 1998).
116. See id. at 748; Sherman v. State, 965 P.2d 903, 915 (Nev. 1998); Castillo v. State, 956
P.2d 103, 109 (Nev. 1998).
117. See Jones v. State, 937 P.2d 55, 65 (Nev. 1997); Collier v. State, 747 P.2d 225, 227 (Nev.
1987).
118. See, e.g., Dawson v. State, 734 P.2d 221, 223 (Nev. 1987) (detailing arguments from the
prosecution that black defendant had a preference for white women).
119. See John H. Blume et al.,
Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital
Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1781-82 (1998) (reviewing racial disparities in prosecutors'
decisions to seek the death penalty in South Carolina).
120. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discriminationin Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433,457 (1995).
121. In capital cases involving white victims and black defendants, prosecutor Joseph Briley's
challenges to black jurors exceeded ninety-four percent. See STEPHEN B. BRIGHT, S. CTR. FOR
HUM. RTS., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ON THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF FURMAN V. GEORGIA 8 (June 26,
1997), available at http:llwww.schr.org/reportstfurman3.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
122. See Bright, supra note 120, at 455-56.
123. See Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1992); Wiese v. State, 811 S.W.2d 958,
960 (Tex. App. 1991).
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answers to questions,

but allow white jurors vAth

the same

characteristics or answers to remain on the panel."' Sometimes
prosecutors may make public comments, out of the courtroom, that

indicate their attitudes toward certain jurors."
In one of the more disturbing recent cases involving racial

discrimination, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a death
penalty conviction in part because of the discovery of a training
videotape used by the Philadelphia district attorney's office detailing
methods to keep blacks off of juries.' : Among other tips, the prosecutor
on the tape suggested that prosecutors lie when asked by judges to

explain their reason for exercising peremptory challenges against black
jurors.'2 In the case that the court reversed, the prosecutor had used
nineteen of his twenty peremptory challenges to strike black jurors.'1 A

study showed that in fourteen cases he had struck black jurors seventyone percent of the time. 29

Biased prosecutors exhibit their racism both in and out of the
courtroom. In one case in Texas, involving a black defendant and a
white victim, the prosecutor and trial judge conducted ex parte pretrial
124. See Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201,204 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Ryan. 987 F.2d 9 0. 973
(3d Cir. 1993); State v. Grate, 423 S.E.2d 119, 120 (S.C. 1992). See generally Bright. supra no'c
120, at 454-55 (discussing how prosecutors often limit the number of blacks on juries during a death
penalty case by excluding them based on their views of the death penalty, w.hich blacks are mare
likely than whites to oppose because of the discriminatory way in %,hichit is applied).
125. See Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204, 207 15th Cir. 1988); see also Hoke v. Netherland,
92 F.3d 1350, 1366 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J., dissenting) (noting the remark of an African-American
prosecutor that he "'wanted to be the first black man to put a %%hite man in the electric chair'1
(emphasis omitted). Unfortunately, defense counsel may likewise be biased against the accus:d. See
Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (noting that the trial court applzinted
counsel who referred to client and the black community in derogatory, prejudicial %a-s at'd 946
F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 506 U.S. 357 (1993). See generally Blume et al., supra no:e 119,
at 1786-87 (quoting a South Carolina prosecutor's public statements attributing the groing crirre
rate to the breakdown of family in the black community and his support of the continued diplay of
the confederate battle flag at the State capitol).
126. See Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717.727,734 (Pa. 20001.
127. See Pete Shellem, Murder Case Sent Back to Philly: Prosecutor's Training ideo!ape
Casts Doubt on Fairness,According to Jurists,PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Jan. 25. 2000. at
B06. Following the discovery of the tape, the state Center for Legal Education. Advozay, and
Defense Assistance requested that the supreme court investigate allegations of disparate justice in
Philadelphia's court system and particularly in death penalty cases. See B. Bergstrom. GroupSeeks
Death Penalty Inquiry-Supreme CourtAsked to Eramine Racism in Erecutions, SUNDAY PATPIOTNEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Jan 17, 1999, at B10.
128. See Basemore, 744 A.2d at 727.
129. See Bergstrom, supra note 127. The Philadelphia district attorney's office also prompted
an article in a 1995 edition of the New York Ties Magazine called The Deadliest D.A. See Tina
Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG.. July 16, 1995, at 20ff, reprinted in DE--tit
PENALTY, supra note 2, at 319.
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sessions in order to practice objections and rulings.'30 In granting state
habeas corpus relief, Judge Perry Pickett commented that '[t]he court
unequivocally concludes that the color of Clarence Brandley's skin was
a substantial factor which pervaded all aspects of the state's capital
prosecution.' ' 1 3' Judge Pickett continued:
"In the 30 years this court has presided over matters in the judicial
system, ... no case has presented a more shocking scenario of the

effects of racial prejudice, perjured testimony, witness intimidation, an
investigation the outcome of which was predetermined, and public
officials
,, 3 who, for whatever motives, lost sight of what is right and
just.
jU t,,132
33

C. JudicialBias'

"'A campaign promise to be tough on crime or to enforce the death
penalty, is evidence of bias that should disqualify a candidate from
sitting in criminal cases.""

130. See Robert Batey, Naked Lunch For Lawyers: William S. Burroughs on Capital
Punishment, Pornography,the Drug Trade, and the PredatoryNature of Human Interaction, 27
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 101, 194 n.497 (1996) (discussing Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989)).
131. Stephanie Saul, Supportfor Death Penalty Growing Across U.S.: Racism, Incompetence
Mar Trials,NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 13, 1994, at A22 (quoting Judge Perry Pickett).
132. Ted Rohrlich, Minister of Justice for the Wrongly Convicted, Jim McCloskey is a
Clergyman and Gumshoe Who Opens the Prison Door, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1990 (Magazine), at
10 (quoting Judge Perry Pickett).
133. A less frequent, but nonetheless significant reason for error in capital cases is juror bias.
Biased jurors cannot be objective in their evaluation of the case. Their prejudices may lead them to
convict an innocent person. Courts have reversed cases based on inappropriate comments or
attention to ethnicity or race. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 698, 700 (5th Cir.
1988) (discussing the failure of a juror to disclose a relative in law enforcement); United States v.
Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1529-34 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting the failure of a juror to disclose prior
knowledge of defendant); Ex parte Pool, 497 So. 2d 537, 538 (Ala. 1986) (noting the failure of a
juror to disclose previous problems with law enforcement); State v. Freeman, 605 So. 2d 1258, 1259
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (discussing the failure of a juror to disclose that he was a police officer);
Abercrombie v. State, 574 So. 2d 879, 881-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (providing the failure of a
juror to disclose that she was the mother of rape victim); In re Hitchings, 860 P.2d 466, 476 (Cal.
1993) (providing the failure of a juror to disclose prior knowledge of the case). Unless counsel has
been totally ineffective in voir dire, many jurors who demonstrate bias against the accused or favor
towards the prosecution have also engaged in lying or deceitful conduct during the jury selection
process. See, e.g., id. This, too, can result in reversal of a conviction.
134. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary, JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb, 1997, at
165, 173 (quoting Justice John Paul Stevens speaking at the 1996 ABA Annual Meeting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges may be
"too responsive" is a political climate in which judges who covet
higher office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must constantly
profess their fealty to the death penalty.'" s

The third most frequent reason that errors occur in capital cases is
judicial bias. While less pervasive than the incidence of ineffective

assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, error prompted by
judicial bias, because it is so reprehensible, may be the most horrific of
the causes of capital punishment injustice. "

Judges on high and low courts have found it advantageous to voice
publicly their support for capital punishment. In a supreme court race in
Nevada, for example, an incumbent justice, supported by the State's
Attorney General, announced that he had a record of fighting crime,
supported the death penalty, and "had voted to uphold the death penalty

seventy-six times."'37 In Alabama, an appellate judge campaigning for
the state supreme court called upon the court to set execution dates in

cases in which habeas claims were pending in federal courts.", A lawyer
in Texas challenged an incumbent appellate judge who had authored an

unpopular opinion promising that if elected he would use the death
penalty, harmless error, and frivolous appeal rules more frequently.'"

Another attorney, campaigning for a judgeship in California, produced
135. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,519 (1995) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
136. See e.g., Bright & Keenan, supra note 58, at 792-93; Gerald F. Uclmn,Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial
Politicization,72 NoTRE DAMEL. REv. 1133, 1135, 1142 (1997).
137. Nevius v. Warden, 944 P.2d 858. 859 (Nev. 1997). aod, 960 P.2d 805 (Nev. 19.93). In a
per curiam opinion denying relief to a death-sentenced inmate who moved that the justice bdisqualified, the Nevada Supreme Court expressed their viewpoint as follows:
Justice Young was simply responding to an assertion, based on one case, that he was
soft on the death penalty and demonstrating to the electorate that the allegation against
him was distorted ....
Citing [his] record in upholding the death penalty was nothing
more than showing that he will enforce Nevada law in an area very important to Nevada
voters.
Id. The dissenting judge noted that "[i]f the public praise and endorsement ... by the attorney
general were not enough in itself, Justice Young's putting forth his 'record' of fighting crimz rather
thanjudging crime adds up ...to an unacceptable appearance of bias in this case." Id. at 860-61
(Springer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
138. See T. Hughes, Montiel Challenges Court to Schcdule Erecutions, Mo1.'Go\ 1ERY. AL,.
ADvERTisER, May 19, 1994, at 3B.
139. See Janet Elliott & Richard Connelly, Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate:His PastIsn't
What It Seems, TEx. LAW., Oct. 3, 1994, at I. Stephen Mansfield defeated Judge Charles F.
Campbell, a twelve year veteran of the court, who had authored the court's opinion "overturning the
capital murder conviction of [a] notorious Houston killer... in Rodriguez %,State" the year before.
Id. For a more detailed discussion of Judge Mansfield and his campaign. see Stephen B. Bright,
Death in Texas, CHAhiPION, July 1999, at 16,24-26.
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and distributed a flyer which noted his qualification for the job to be "the

number of 'killers' he had sent to death row [while working] as a
prosecutor."' 4
Even those judges who do not face a vote by the citizens of their
states sense reason to appear to favor capital punishment. In California,
for example, individuals who seek judicial appointments are reportedly
asked whether they personally favor the death penalty. 4' Governors in
of their own
other states have campaigned against justices, even some
42

appointees, because of their decisions in capital cases.'

Judges who favor the death penalty and who decide cases in

accordance with their biases will often influence the outcome in
individual capital cases by their rulings. But a judge who favors the
death penalty can have a much more devastating effect on the overall
reliability and fairness of the capital justice system.
If pro-death judges desire appointments to higher courts during

their careers, they may shy away from making the difficult, politically
sensitive decisions that seem to pit them against capital punishment. The

judge who wants to make his or her position on capital punishment
known, for political reasons, may invite cases that demonstrate his or her
fervor. They may assign inexperienced lawyers to defend those accused
44

of capital crimes1 43 or show inappropriate deference to the prosecutor.

Some judges may even be incapable of shedding4 their own prejudices
and unable to rule in a fair and objective manner. 1
140. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., KILLING FOR VOTES: THE DANGERS
OF POLITICIZING THE DEATH PENALTY PROCESS 7 (Oct. 1996), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicrkfv.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
141. See Greg Mitchell, Litmus Test?, RECORDER, July 22, 1999, at 1.
142. See Burt Hubbard & Ann Carnahan, Angered Over Death Penalty, Lamm Assails Two
Judges, ROCKY MTN. NEws (Denver), Mar. 12, 1994, at 5A. The Author of this Article was
challenged and defeated in a retention election largely orchestrated by the governor and the
governor's party. See Bright, supra note 134, at 166, 168-69. The governor promised to appoint
only death penalty supporters to judgeships. See id. at 166, 171.
143. See supratext accompanying notes 68-69.
144. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 58, at 803-11. Bright and Keenan describe judges who
criticize higher courts and identify themselves as former prosecutors. See id. at 811-13.
145. See id. Bright and Keenan discuss an unseemly story in which a judge stated "that he was
doing 'God's work' in seeing to it that a capital defendant was executed. See id. at 812-13. The
same judge, William Harmon, from Houston, Texas, reportedly asked rhetorically whether
arrangements could be made for a van transporting death row inmates to be blown up on its way to
the courthouse. See id. at 813; Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas
Death Penalty, 1973-1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 26 (1994). Other examples of judicial bias
can be found. See United States v. Van Chase, 137 F.3d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing a trial
judge who commented during voir dire on the defendant's ethnicity, Native American, and the
location of the crime, a reservation); State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9, 25 (Mo. 1996) (quoting a trial
judge referring to a juror's race and saying "'I don't know what constitutes black.... Years ago
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IV.

RECENT PROPOSALS TO REMEDY ERRORSILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULES

When a committee appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court
proposed new rules pertaining to capital cases earlier this year, it was
' Since Illinois was the focus
lauded as "'a step in the right direction."""
of most of the recently publicized cases of wrongful conviction, and the
state in which a pro-death penalty governor had temporarily halted
executions, much attention was focused on the state's attempt to cure the
problems.'47
The cures suggested by the Illinois Supreme Court Rules and the
Illinois Rules of ProfessionalConduct fall into three categories.' 3 First,
the rules address the obligations of the prosecutor. '" Second, the rules
create and define a Capital Litigation Trial Bar." Lastly, the rules

require mandatory training for trial judges hearing capital cases.''
Are these rules.52 the answer to the flawed capital punishment

scheme in Illinois, and perhaps, the country?"' 3 Will they improve the
they used to say one drop of blood constitutes black."' (quoting the court)); State v. Smulls. No.
75511, 1996 WVL 344673, at *15 (Mo. June 25, 1996), mnodificd by 935 S.W.2d 9 IMo. 1996)
(quoting the trial judge as saying "'[w]e can't hold a barbeque because we don't have a black judge
to do the cooking."'). But see State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 340 (Mo, 19961 ,(White, J.,
dissenting) (describing a judge's press release issued six days before trial as a p-irniious, racial
stereotype.. not ambiguous or complex [because it said] ... 'minorities ... are not hard- ,lorking
taxpayers").
146. Steve Mills, Bar Raisedfor CapitalCase Trials: State High Court Sets Standards.CHI.
TRm., Jan. 23,2001, at 1 (quoting Illinois Chief Justice Moses Harrison 1).
147. The Illinois Supreme Court's committee is only one of a host of groups in Illinois working
to suggest remedies for the problem of wrongful convictions. Other committees throughout the
state, including the panel appointed by Governor Ryan, continue to vork on their reports. See IlI.
Governor Orders a Halt to Executions: Mistaken Convictions Spur Move, Cim.EsTON GAZETTE,
May 21,2000, at 5A.
148. The amendments to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules and the Illinois Rules of
ProfessionalConduct include some provisions that are beyond the scope and focus of this Article.
They allow, for example, depositions to be taken in capital cases. See ILL Sup. CT. R. 4161c). They
provide for conferences for the purposes of case management in capital cases. See id. R. 416tf). The
new rules also include provisions which apply to DNA evidence and its admission in capital cases.
See id. R1417 (2001).
149. See ILL. RULEs OFPROF'LCONDucr R. 3.8 (2001).
150. SeeILL. SuP. CT.R. 714.
151. See hi.
R. 43 (2001).
152. The Institute for Law and Justice has published a compendium of all standards prently
in use in capital cases. See generally INST. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, CO.MFENDIUIM OF STAmmrmDS
FOR

INDIGENT

DEFENSE

SYSTE.MS

(2000).

available

at

http://wv.ojp.usdoj.govrmdigentdefense/compendium (last visited Oct. 11,2001).
153. This Article has assumed the correctness of the studies conducted by the U.S. Dpartment
of Justice and by James Liebman, as well as the findings of the Northwestern Innocence Project.
That is, this Article presumes that the capital punishment system in America is not wsorking
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two-thirds serious error rate in capital cases? Are other bandages
necessary'- to mend a terribly broken system?'
A.

The Rules

1. Rules and Defense Counsel
In an effort to "assure that capital defendants receive fair and

impartial trials,"156 and that errors in capital trial are minimized, the
Special Committee on Capital Cases ("Special Committee") has created
' With the exception of the
a Capital Litigation Trial Bar ("Trial Bar"). 57
elected or appointed Attorney General or State's Attorney, no licensed
attorney who is not a member of the Trial Bar is allowed to appear as

lead or co-counsel for the either the state or the defense in a capital
case.

158

properly. While the empirical basis for that position is the studies and findings set forth above, the
Author's personal observations as appointed counsel for capital defendants at trial and at
postconviction, as a trial judge, as an appellate and supreme court justice in a death penalty case, as
a consultant to the ABA Pro Bono Death Penalty Project and the Nevada Capital Cases Resource
Center, and as a frequent lecturer at judicial education programs on capital punishment corroborate
that conclusion.
154. The Liebman study addressed whether Illinois' errors were actually aberrational and not
indicative of the entire country's capital punishment system and found the rate of serious error to be
slightly less than the national average (sixty-six as compared with sixty-eight percent). See
LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 8.
155. Those who disagree vehemently with the correctness of the Liebman study argue that the
anti-death penalty movement specializes in the abolition of the truth. One of the most vocal
proponents of capital punishment, Professor Paul Cassell, testified before Congress on July 23,
1993, "that the risk to innocent life from failing to carry out capital sentences imposed under
contemporary safeguards far outweighs the speculative and remote risk that an execution might be
in error." Comm. on the JudiciaryU.S. House Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights: Clains
of Innocence in CapitalCases (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Associate Professor of Law, University
of Utah College of Law), at http://www.law.utah.edu/cassellltestthousehearing.htm (last visited
Mar. 13, 2001). His reaction to the most recent findings have not yet been published, but will likely
mirror criticisms published by other death penalty activists. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation,
for example, issued a press release on June 19, 2000, criticizing the Liebman study as "riddled with
unjustified assumptions and false statements." Press Release, Michael Rushford, President, CJLF,
Death Penalty "Error" Study Has Errors of Its Own (June 19, 2000), at
http://www.cjlf.orgtreleases/00-11.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2001). As proof of that attack, the press
release discusses nineteen California cases out of the more than 5000 cases reviewed. See id. The
Foundation also faults the study's inclusion of cases with constitutional errors such as Fourth and
Fifth Amendment violations in the category of cases with serious errors. See id.
156. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 416(b)(i).
157. See id. R. 701, 714.
158. See id. R. 701(b), 714(c).
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Membership in the Trial Bar is limited to attorneys who are
certified by the supreme court to have met the qualifications. To be
qualified counsel, must be admitted to practice in Illinois and
(2) [b]e an experienced and active trial practitioner with at least five
years of criminal litigation experience[;] (3) [h]ave substantial
familiarity with the ethics, practice, procedure and rules [of the Illinois
courts;] (4) [have prior experience as lead or co-counsel in no fewer
than eight felony jury trials which were tried to completion, at least
two of which were murder prosecutions; and either (i) have completed
at least 12 hours of training in the preparation and trial of capital cases
... within two years prior to making application for admission; or (ii)
have substantial familiarity with and extensive experience in the use of
expert witnesses, and forensic and medical evidence.... '
Requirements for co-counsel fall into the same categories with fewer
years' experience required.'9 The rules allow the supreme court to waive
any of the requirements if counsel can demonstrate the ability to provide
effective capital
representation based on other trial or appellate
6'
experience.'
In recommending the creation of a specialized bar to try capital
cases, the Special Committee opines that "[tihe most important
safeguard of the fairness and accuracy of capital trials is the competence,
professionalism, and integrity of the attorneys who try [the] cases," both
prosecutors and defense attorneys.'6" The new adoption is based on the
Special Committee's finding that minimum standards consistently
applied "are the only way to ensure significant, systemwide
improvement in the quality of advocacy in capital trials."'' The
observation, as far as it goes, is undoubtedly correct, but the real
question that remains is whether quality advocacy will improve the error
rate in capital cases. Will better-trained lawyers be able to prevent the
innocent from being sentenced to death?
The rules include new obligations for defense counsel as well. For
example, under Rule 416, defense counsel is required to file a certificate
of readiness with the court not less than fourteen days before the trial. t'
The certificate must verify that counsel has met with the client and

159. Id. R.714(b).

160.
than five
161.
162.

Co-counsel must have practiced for three years and have had prior experience in no less
felony jury trials which were tried to completion. See id.
See id. R. 714(d).
Id. R. 714 committee comments: Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases.

163. Id.

164. See id. R. 416(h).
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discussed discovery, the state's case, and defenses relevant to trial and
sentencing.'6 The comments do not attempt to explain the reasons for
the new certificate of readiness, but it is likely a way to forestall claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Regardless of the specificity of the Trial Bar qualifications or the
newness of the written certification, defense counsel has always been
ethically obliged to undertake only legal matters in which counsel can be
competent and thoroughly prepared for trial. Both the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and its predecessor, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility already require "legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation,"
"reasonable diligence and promptness,"
and
"preparation adequate in the circumstances. ' 66
The comments to the ethical rules requiring that lawyers be
competent and diligent emphasize that lawyers be sufficiently skilled in
a particular matter, or capable of achieving the requisite skill with
"reasonable preparation."' 6 This, too, has been an undeniable ethical
requirement since lawyers became subject to licensing and therefore,
except for the appointed or elected state's attorney, applicable members
of the legal profession must belong to the Trial Bar.'6
While competence and preparation are certainly essential to the fair
representation of those charged with capital offenses, Part III of this
Article has suggested that much more is needed to meet that goal. The
"greased lightning" lawyers described would have easily met the
requirements to be members of the Trial Bar. In Illinois, for example, it
is suggested that eleven of the thirteen exonerated defendants were
represented by counsel who would have met the qualifications.' 69 More
pointedly, even the best prepared and most qualified criminal defense

165. See id.
166. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3 (2000); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(2) (1983). The "[nleglect [of] a legal matter entrusted to [a lawyer]"
is also forbidden. Id. DR 6-101(A)(3).
167. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 4.
In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill ... relevant
factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's
general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the
preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to
refer[,J ... associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field.
Id. 1 I. "The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake." Id. 5,
168. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 701(b).
169. This information was compiled by Rob Warden, Executive Director of the Center on
Wrongful Conviction at Northwestern University School of Law. It is on file in their offices and is
being submitted to the Governor's panel studying capital cases in Illinois.
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lawyer cannot surmount perjured testimony, secreted evidence, or biased
judges.
2. Rules and Prosecutors
A single addition is made to Rule 3.8, the existing Illinois ethical
rule that sets out the special duties of prosecutors."" Whether issued as a
reminder or a warning, the new subsection (a) is actually a paraphrase
from an almost century-old United States Supreme Court decision."'
Subsection (a) of Rule 3.8 provides: "The duty of a public prosecutor or
other government lawyer is to seek justice, not merely to convict.""
The Special Committee added, along with the new provision,
commentary supporting the new provision.' The Special Committee
noted that the provision was in accord with the ABA Standardsfor
Criminal Justice and was based upon principles that greatly predated
these standards. 7 4 It quoted from a 1924 decision of the Illinois Supreme

Court '75 and from the often-quoted case of Berger vt United States,'

which eloquently described the "peculiar" public servant role of the
prosecuting attorney:
[The prosecuting attorney's] twofold aim ... is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. [The prosecutor] may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he [or she] should do so. But, while
[the prosecutor] may strike hard blows, [he or she] is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much [the prosecutor's] duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.""
The new commentary, while more detailed, actually outlined the same
principles of prosecutorial responsibility that have long been the norm.'7 3
The remainder of Rule 3.8 likewise enumerates long-standing

170. See ILL. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.8 (2001). This Rule was taken from the ABA
Standardsfor CriminalJustice. See id R. 3.8 committee comments.
171. See id. (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78. 88 (1935)).
172. Id. R. 3.8(a).

173. See id. R. 3.8 committee comments.
174. See id.
175. See People v. Cochran, 145 N.E. 207,214 (111. 1924).

176. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
177. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 committee comments (2001) (quoting Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
178. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. [ I (2000) ("A procutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.").
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prosecutorial responsibilities, many of which are constitutionally
based.17 9
In addition to reiterating the obligations of prosecutors, the newly
adopted rules include four substantive additions to Illinois death penalty
procedure. Rule 411 makes discovery rules which are applicable in
criminal cases applicable to the sentencing phase in capital cases.8 0 Rule
412 requires the state to "make a good-faith effort to specifically identify
by description or otherwise any material disclosed pursuant to [the
discovery rule] based upon the information available to the State at the
time the material is disclosed to the defense."' 8'
In addition, Rule 416 requires the prosecution to certify compliance
with the discovery requirements of Rule 412 at least fourteen days
before trial.' n The certification must include a representation that the
prosecution has contacted others involved in the investigation and
preparation of the case to secure material which is required to be
disclosed to the defense.'83
Rule 416 requires prosecutors to give early notice of the intent "to
seek or reject imposition of the death penalty by filing a Notice of Intent
to Seek or Decline Death Penalty."' The Notice is required to list all of
the statutory aggravating factors which the state intends to rely upon for
the imposition of the death penalty.'" However, one aspect of Rule 416
is particularly troublesome. The rules provide that in cases in which the
prosecutor has failed to provide any notice, counsel (and the court) must
presume an intent to seek the death penalty.'8 6 Perhaps this is intended
only as an assurance that sufficiently trained counsel are appointed in all
serious cases, but it seems directly contradictory to the long-standing
principle that the death penalty is to be sought sparingly and selectively
based upon sufficient aggravating circumstances to set the case apart

179. See ILL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.8(b)-(e) (2001).

180. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. 411 (2001).
181. Id. R. 412(c). The proposal refers to this requirement as "the specific-identification
proposal." Id. R. 412 committee comments. The committee comments that "the duty to specifically

identify is not as broad as the duty to disclose under Rule 412(c)." Id. The good faith effort required
"is intended to avoid creating an impossible burden for the prosecution." Id. Further, the
requirement is to "be viewed in light of the information available to the State when the material is
disclosed to the defense," thus disallowing an evaluation based on hindsight information. Id.

182. See id. R. 416(g).
183. See id.
184. Id. R. 416(c). The deadline is "as soon as practicable" but no "later than 120 days after
arraignment, unless for good cause shown, the court directs otherwise." Id.
185. See id.
186. See id. R. 416(d).
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from other murder cases.'" This provision seems to imply just the
opposite and may result in further abuse by prosecutors in the frequency
and disparity in seeking capital punishment. It also creates an
inappropriate assumption that may indirectly affect the acceptance of
and attitude toward capital punishment.
Just as the added provision to Rule 3.8 is not novel, neither are the
procedural additions. While the elaboration of the discovery obligations
and the inclusion of the notice and certification requirements may be
new to Illinois prosecutors, the constitutional and ethical bases for the
requirement are not. In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Brady r.
Maryland,t that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."' Although subsequent
decisions tinkered with the application of the rule when postconviction
evidence turned up the failure to disclose, t the Brady rule has remained
vital since its inception. The Brady constitutional rule, like the Rule 416
procedural ones, applies to all members of the prosecution team, not just
the individual prosecutor in the case.'9'
Moreover, Illinois, and the other states that have adopted
professional conduct rules based upon the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, have always required prosecutors to
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to

187. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 US. 279,305-06 (19871 (noting that in their decisions

since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court had "identified a constitutionally
permissible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty," including "a required threshold
below which the death penalty cannot be imposed" and the inclusion of "any relevant circumstance"

that would cause a sentencer to reject the death penalty); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-97
(1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Georgia's amended murder provisions that require at least one of
ten "statutory aggravating circumstances" to exist before the death penalty can be imposed).
188. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
189. Id at 87.

190. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,669 (1985).
191. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,436-37 (1995). A duty to disclose exists even %hen
the prosecution is unaware of the evidence and offers an "'open file."' See Smith v. Sec'y D.p't of
Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 828 (10th Cir. 1995). All law enforcement agencies, even if different agencies
under different governments (federal and state), are considered part of the prosecution team. See
United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566,569-70 (5th Cir. 1979).
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the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known to the prosecutor....'92
In its elaborate discussion of a prosecutor's duties in the
commentary to the new Rule 416, the Special Committee referenced
"cases condemning the knowing use of perjured testimony."'"" Again,
restrictions on the knowing use of perjured testimony by prosecuting
attorneys are anything but new. In 1935, 1942, 1957, and 1959, the U.S.
Supreme Court warned prosecutors that the use of perjured testimony or
false evidence violated due process. ' And while not subject to
constitutional enforcement, dishonesty, fraud, or deceit on the part of a
lawyer has been recognized as unethical since the first codification of
ethical standards.'9
These observations, then, lead to the same questions posed about
the new requirements for capital defense counsel. Will reiterating
constitutional and ethical obligations diminish the number of cases in
which compliance does not occur? Will adding a written reminder that
their goal is to "seek justice" cause prosecutors to exercise their
discretion and power more fairly in capital cases? Just as many defense
lawyers who represented innocent individuals sentenced to death were
"qualified," so too were prosecuting attorneys required at the time of
their violations to provide discovery and to do justice. The real question
remains whether restating and reminding will result in reform.
3. Rules for Judges
The final category of newly adopted rules relates to the competency
of judges.' 96 A new rule, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 43, requires a
"judge who in his [or her] current assignment may be called upon to

192. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(d) (2000). The predecessor to Rule 3.8, DR 7103(B), likewise required disclosure of exculpatory and mitigating evidence. See MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1983).
193. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 416 committee comments.
194. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957)
(per curiam); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112
(1935) (per curiam).
195. DR 1-102(A)(4) provided that "lawyer[s] shall not ... [e]ngage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR
1-102(A)(4) (1983). Conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice" was also prohibited. Id.
DR 1-102(A)(5).
196. The rules also provide for a case management conference at which the court will assure
compliance with the discovery, certification, and qualification rules. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 416(0.
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preside over a capital case [to] attend a Capital Litigation Seminar at
least once every two years."' 9'
Continuing instruction about the ever-changing capital punishment
law is certainly essential to the fair resolution of capital cases. Like
lawyers, however, judges have always been required under the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct to "maintain professional competence in" the
law.' 98 Will specific educational opportunities make a meaningful
difference in the fairness and accuracy of capital cases?
Just as judges have been required to maintain competence in the
law, so too have judges always been prohibited from making promises
or pledges of conduct in office.' 9 The Commentary to the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct notes that judges should emphasize their obligation to
uphold the law, regardless of their personal opinion. : " Nevertheless, as
the examples cited in Part III of this Article have shown, occasions are
far too frequent when judges place their political ambition over their
ethical obligations.
The vast majority of judges will benefit from regular training on the
substantive and procedural aspects of capital law. But for others, as
evidenced by some of the examples in Part III of this Article, training is
not the answer. Those judges who are willing to flaunt the ethical
prescripts of the profession are just as willing to ignore the training they
receive. The answer for those judges is not a capital litigation seminar. It
is likewise not even an ethics seminar. The answer for those judges is
disqualification from all capital proceedings.?'

197. Id. R. 43(b) (2001). The seminar should include, according to the Rule, "the judge's role
in capital cases, motion practice, current procedures in jury selection, substantive and procedural
death penalty case law, confessions, and the admissibility of evidence in the areas of scientific tace
materials, genetics, and DNA analysis:' Id. R. 43(a). The original propoal required attendance
every six years. See Laura Sivitz, Judge Unveils Plan to Help Avert Errorsin CapitalCases. C1ll.
DAmY HERALD, Jan. 20, 2000, at 13.
198. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(2) (1999).

199. See id. Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i).
200. See id. Canon 5(A)(3)(d) cmt.
201. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge shall disqualify hini-lf or
herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." See id.
Canon 3(E)(1). It is beyond the scope of this Article as to whether those judges should in faet t2a
removed from the bench for their failure to comply with Canon 1 of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, which requires that judges act independently and "%ithout fear or favor." Id. Canon I cmt.
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V. REAL REFORM
Even the staunchest supporters of capital punishment must support
a system in which
the defendant whose life is at risk will be represented by competent
counsel ... [an] attorney [who] will investigate all aspects of the case,
follow all evidentiary and procedural rules, and appear before a judge
who is still committed to the protection of defendants' rights-even
now, as the prospect of meaningful judicial oversight has diminished
[under circumstances in which] ... the prosecution, in urging the
penalty of death, will have exercised its discretion wisely, free from
bias, prejudice, or political motive, and will be humbled, rather than
emboldened, by the awesome authority conferred by the State.2
Is such a system realistic? Can a government find a way to fairly and
accurately determine who should die for the violation of its laws?
Some would suggest that the obvious answer is "no." Justice
Thurgood Marshall, a death penalty opponent, suggested:
[n]o matter how careful courts are, the possibility of pejured
testimony, mistaken honest testimony, and human error remain all too
real. We have no way of judging how many innocent persons have
been executed but ... [s]urely there will be more as long as capital
punishment remains part of our penal lawY 3
Are we saddled with accepting that the "imperfect" capital
punishment system will always make some mistakes? Must we accept
that some innocent people will be executed simply because a perfect
system is impossible? Or are we unwilling to undergo the reform
necessary to create a system that is not broken?
The reforms to date have focused on what might be tagged the
mechanics of the system. Defense lawyers should be better trained and
higher paid. Prosecutors should decide early when to seek the penalty
and should openly disclose information. Judges should be learned in the
law and efficient in the administration of a capital punishment case. But
repairing the mechanical aspects of the system will not necessarily repair
the system. Clients whose lawyers are trained and paid well will still go
to death row if judges and prosecutors use death penalty cases as

202. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
203. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,367-68 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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political stepping stones and if prosecutors continue to view the cases as
a battle to be won rather than a problem to be solved.
While real reform will require real study, commitment, and
resources, some reform measures that should attribute more to correcting
error, than the mechanical ones, are obvious. All actors in the capital
punishment system-police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judgesshould be subject to severe discipline for breaching ethical obligations in
capital cases. If the police or the prosecutor fabricates evidence,
improves testimony, fails to disclose the required information, or makes
inappropriate arguments to the jury, they should be publicly sanctioned.
The possible sanctions should include suspension from the duties of
their public offices. Defense lawyers, likewise, who fail to fulfill their
sacred obligation to the client facing death should be disciplined and, at
the very least, removed from the roster of those eligible for appointment
in a capital case. Judges who utilize catchy slogans about law and order
to secure their positions should be publicly reprimanded; if they are
incumbents, they should be censured publicly. They should certainly be
disqualified from sitting in affected cases and perhaps suspended from
their duties as well.
Only if the actors know that real consequences will follow their acts
will they attempt to correct them. Moreover, making the public aware
that the government will not tolerate unfair practices among those
charged with this responsibility will cast a more serious light on their
obligations as citizens.
Lawyers and judges are charged with the responsibility of reporting
violations of the ethical codes. -° Yet it is only rare that an appellate
opinion finding prosecutorial misconduct is accompanied by a letter to
the disciplinary authorities. If we purport to be a profession that polices
its own, we must be aggressive about that function lest it become a farce.
In addition to taking a more serious approach to ethical violations
that occur during capital trials, other systemic reforms should be
considered. Any procedure that would assist in securing an accurate
result should be embraced. Thus, for example, police should videotape
complete encounters with the accused and witnesses. Evidence which
might bear traces of DNA should be carefully preserved and tested.
Eyewitness identifications should be subject to the most strenuous
scrutiny.

204. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2000); MODEL CODE OF Jt D:CL,%

CONDUCT Canon 3(D) (1999).
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The government should be barred from giving informants, so-called
snitches or cooperators, tangible benefits for their testimony in capital
cases, unless the informant is an eyewitness. Some method to review the
prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty should be implemented
statewide, emphasizing consistency in the selection. Prosecutors who try
capital cases should be required to prepare and argue their own appeals.
Those prosecutors would then defend their own unprofessional or
unconstitutional conduct before the appellate courts.
If the goal of capital punishment reform is to assure accurate and
fair results in capital cases, judges must be held to the responsibility of
disqualifying themselves when appropriate. Judges who have manifested
a fixed opinion on capital punishment should be automatically
disqualified from presiding in death penalty cases. Jurors should
likewise be informed about the nature of incarceration and the meaning
of a life sentence without parole in the particular jurisdiction."
Many of these reforms would require a rethinking by courts. Rather
than asking whether an act prejudiced the defendant or made the
proceeding unfair or unreliable, the question would be whether the act
assisted in the fair determination of the issues. Counsel's conduct would
not be judged by the harmless error standard, but would be subject to
sanction if it did not affirmatively contribute to the just trial of the cause.
To those who have practiced in the criminal justice system,
particularly in the trial of capital cases, these suggestions sound bizarre.
The last fifteen years have seen courts, Congress, and crafty counsel
create more and more procedural bars to fairness in capital litigation."
Those efforts may have speeded up the process of execution; thus if our
system's worth was to be measured by speed, then those efforts would
have been on track.
But a system that undertakes to determine who lives and who dies
should not pride itself on speed, but on accuracy and fairness. Recent
efforts to expedite capital punishment may have succeeded in
expedition, and they have certainly succeeded in rendering a more
unfair, unreliable system.
205. In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court has lessened the likelihood that judges will
reform their jury instructions in capital cases. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 233-34 (2000)
(noting that judges are not required to clarify whether death penalty was mandatory upon a finding
of an aggravating circumstance); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (holding that
judges are not required to give an instruction on mitigating evidence).
206. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U.S. 538, 553-54 (1998); Brown v. Texas, 522 U.S. 940, 940-41 (1997) (Stevens, J. respecting
denial of certiorari).
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It has been said that "the way in which we choose those who will
die reveals the depth of moral commitment among the living.' ' What is
presently revealed would demonstrate a shallow moral commitment
indeed. If, however, we wish to deepen that commitment to the end that
no innocent person shall be executed by our government, then we must
choose real, substantive reform. Costly? Perhaps. Difficult? Most
certainly. But with the greater likelihood that whatever imperfections
must remain in the administration of death, they will not include the
execution of the innocent.

207.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,344 (19871 (Brennan. J.. dissningi.

